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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Plaintiff,
Case No. 870066-CA
vs.
JAMES FLETCHER ANDERSON and
JODE W. ANDERSON,
Defendants.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, Salt Lake
Department, finding Appellant-Andersons guilty of violation
of Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 prohibiting
the presence of an individual under the age of 21 in an
establishment licensed to distribute draft beer.

This

appeal is taken as of right under Rule 3(a) of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals. •
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Are Sections 19-3-8 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City and 19-3-9 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City
constitutional pursuant to the United States Constitution,
and/or the Constitution of the State of Utah?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
United States Constitution
Amendment XII Section 2
The transportation or importation into any state,
territory, or possession of the United States for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Section 32A-1-5.
(21)

Definitions.

As used in this title:

"Minor" means any person under the age of 21

years.
Section 32A-10-7.
Cities and towns within their corporate limits, and
counties outside of incorporated cities and towns have the
power to license, tax, regulate, or prohibit the sale of
light beer, at retail, in bottles, or draft.

Licenses shall

not be granted to sell beer in the proximity of any church
or school, the local authority granting a license has the
authority to determine in each case what constitutes
proximity.
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City
Sec. 19-3-8.

Presence of minors in class "C" and class

"D" premises prohibited.

It shall be unlawful and shall

constitute an offense of strict liability for any person
under the age of twenty-one years to:

-2-

(a) Enter or be in or

about any premises licensed as a class "C", or class "D"
establishment, for the sale of beer, or (b) To drink beer or
any other alcoholic beverages in said licensed premises,
(c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall
be deemed guilty of an infraction and may not be imprisoned,
but shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed $299.
Sec. 19-3-9.
establishments.

Unlawful to permit minors in certain
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute

an offense of strict liability for any licensee of a class
"C M , or class "D", license for the sale of beer or any
operator, agent, or employee of such licensee to permit any
person under the age of twenty-one years to remain in or
about such licensed premises.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Municipal ordinances are entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality.

The burden is upon the appellants-

Andersons to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the invalidity
of the ordinance.

Salt Lake City v. Savage.

Neither at

the trial, nor in the stipulated evidence was any evidence
presented showing the ordinance reflected unequally upon the
appellants-Andersons, nor was there any showing of
unreasonable classification and application of laws to Class
"C" licensed taverns.

1

541 P.2d 1035 (1975) .
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Amendment Twenty-one of the U.S. Constitution clearly
gives states the right to ban or regulate alcoholic
beverages.

The Twenty-first Amendment must be read in

conjunction with the other amendments.

This requires the

courts to uphold the alcohol related laws if they bear a
reasonable relationship to legitimate state interests.

This

is true even if the ordinance impacts upon rights normally
protected by the first ten Amendments.

The Twenty-first

Amendment gives an added presumption of validity of State
regulation in dealing with alcoholic beverages.
Federal law as well as State law recognize the
legislature's right to develop different classes and
regulate according to classes.

Both the State and the City

classify licenses for the sale of alcoholic beverages into
several classifications.

Each classification has its own

privileges and prohibitions.

There has been no showing by

appellant-Andersons that the classification scheme adopted
by the City is arbitrary.

The State statutes cited by

appellant-Anderson-Anderson acknowledge the City's power to
regulate in the area of alcoholic beverages.

Due process

and equal protection of the law are met if all members of
the class are treated equally even though treatment may vary
from class to class.
The reasonableness of the classification is shown by
the fact Class "C" taverns serve alcohol for consumption on
the premises for profit.

As such they are different from

-4-

restaurants whose primary business is food items; or private
clubs that are required to be nonprofit and which are
regulated by an agency of the State,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ARE ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
AND EVERY REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION WILL BE
USED (ESPECIALLY IN THE REGULATION OF ALCOHOL
PURSUANT TO THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION) TO RENDER AN ORDINANCE AND
ITS CLASSIFICATIONS VALID. THE BURDEN OF
PROOF IS ON THE CHALLENGER TO PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THE INVALIDITY OF AN
ORDINANCE.
As the Utah Supreme Court specifically stated:
"In reviewing an ordinance or a statute to
ascertain its constitutionality, certain
rules of construction must be applied:
M

(a) A legislative enactment is presumed to
be valid and in conformity with the
Constitution.
"(b) It should not be held to be invalid
unless it is shown beyond a reasonabable
doubt to be incompatible with some particular
constitutional provision. (Emphasis added).
"(c) The burden of showing invalidity of an
ordinance or statute is upon the one who
makes the challenge."
Mr. Justice Washington of the United States explained
the policy underlying the presumption of constitutionality

Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 at 1037 (Utah
1975) .
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in Ogden v. Saunders,

3

he stated:

"It is but a decent respect due the wisdom,
the integrity, and the patriotism of the
legislative body by which any law is passed
to presume in favor of its validity until its
violation of the Constitution is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt." (Emphasis
added.)
Municipal ordinances, like State statutes, are
presumptively valid and the courts will indulge in every
reasonable construction to render such a legislative act
4
valid and constitutional.

THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND SUPREME COURT
DECISION ALLOW GREATER REGULATION OF ALCOHOL
BY STATE GOVERNMENTS.
The presumption of constitutionality is especially
strong in alcohol related matters. Justice Renquist wrote
5
in California v. LaRue,
(upholding the right to regulate
dancers and entertainment at bars in the face of First
Amendment - free speech challenge):
"Given the added presumption in favor of the
validity of the state regulation in this
area, that the Twenty-first Amendment
requires, we cannot hold that the regulations
3

12 Wheaton 213, 6 L.Ed. 606 at p. 625 of L.Ed.

(1827).

4
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 19.05-.06 at
375 (3d ed. rev.); Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035,
1037, (Utah 1975), cert, denied 425 U.S. 915, 47 L.Ed.2d
766; State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980); Baker v.
Matheson, 607 P. 223 (Utah 1979); Chandler v. Department of
Employment Security, 678 P.2d 315 (Utah 1984).
5

409 U.S. 109, 34 L.Ed. 342, 98 S.Ct. 390 (1972).

-6-

on their face violate the federal
Constitution." at p. 352. (Emphasis added.)
The appellant-Andersons cite the case of Craig v.
Boren

without noting that the holding was based upon a

suspect classification of sex.

Boren held the drinking age

in Oklahoma for men (age 21) could not be greater than that
of women (18) .
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held
the Twenty-first Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
specifically gives States the power to regulate alcohol.
The Boren case affirmed the principles enunciated in
Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp.

which held that

constitutional amendments must be considered in light of
each other.
As the amendments are considered in light of each other
it becomes very clear the Supreme Court allows the state to
impose restrictions on activities that may normally be
protected by the first ten amendments to the U.S.
Constitution on places that sell alcohol.
g
California v. LaRue,

In the case of

supra, the U.S.Supreme Court upheld

restrictions on entertainment in bars and nightclubs even
though some of the banned entertainment was normally
429 U.S. 190, 50 L.Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct. 451 (1976).
7

377 U.S. 322 (1964).

8

409 U.S. 109.
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protected free speech under the First Amendment.

The Court

"The state regulations here challenged come
to us, not in context of censoring a dramatic
performance in a theatre, but rather in a
context of licensing bars and nightclubs to
sell liquor by the drink."
"In Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,
41, 16 L.Ed.2d 336, 865 at 1254 (1966), this
court said:
"Consideration of any state law regulating
intoxicating beverages must begin with the
Twenty-first Amendment, the second section of
which provides that: ! the transportation or
importation into any state territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.f
"The court further stated:
"While the states, vested as they are with
general police power, require no specific
grant of authority in the Federal
Constitution to legislate with respect to
matters traditionally within the scope of
police powers, the broad sweep of the Twentyfirst Amendment has been recognized on
conferring something more than the normal
health, welfare and morals. In Hostetter v.
Idlewide Liquor Corp. 377 U.S. 324, 12
L.Ed.2d 350, 84 S.Ct. 1293 (1964) the court
reaffirmed by reason of the Twenty-first
Amendment fa state is totally unconfined by
traditional commerce clause limitations when
it restricts the importation of intoxicants
destined for use, distribution or consumption
within its borders.1 Still earlier the Court
stated in State Board v. Young's Market Co.,
229 U.S. 59, 81 L.Ed 38, 57 S.Ct. 77 (1936):
f
a classification recognized by the Twentyfirst Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by
the Fourteenth.1" pp. 349-350 of Law Ed.
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Thus the regulation of establishments selling alcoholic
beverages is in large measure left to the States.
B.
THE UTAH
STANDARD
OF EQUAL
RELATION

SUPREME COURT HAS ALSO HELD THE
OF REVIEW FOR CASES CLAIMING DENIAL
PROTECTION IS THE REASONABLE
TEST.

The Utah Supreme Court imposes the standard of
reasonable relation in viewing challenges to ordinances
based upon a denial of equal protection.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Where a legislative enactment creates no
inherently suspect classification, touches
upon no fundamental interest as recognized in
the Constituion, it satisfies the exigencies
of equal protection if the classifications
made thereby has a reasonable basis in
legitimate legislative objective."
Further, in State v. Amicone

the appellant-Anderson

was complaining that a Utah law mandating jail time for a
misdemeanor was a denial of equal protection as no other
misdemeanor required mandatory jail time.

The Utah Supreme

Court said:
"The defendant does not demonstrate why a
strict scrutiny standard, rather than a
rational basis standard should be applied in
determining the constitutionality of the
classification . . .
In our view, the
rational basis test is the appropriate test
to apply. The classification made by the
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1981) (upholding ban on opposite sex massages).
10

689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984).
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statute in this case is not founded on a
suspect class nor does it impinge upon a
fundamental liberty as that term has been
used in equal protection cases. The statute
in question bears a reasonable and
substantial relation to a legitimate state
objective." p. 1343.
Given the fact both the Utah State Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court require a presumption of
validity to State laws when facing a constitutional
challenge it is clear the ordinances must survive if the
appellant-Andersons cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the ordinance is invalid.
POINT II
CITY HAS POWER TO MAKE REASONABLE CLASSIFICATIONS.
It is axiomatic that governments may make reasonable
classifications.

The United States Supreme Court has

stated:
"No question is or could be made by the
corporation as to the right of a State, or a
municipality with properly delegated power,
to enact laws or ordinances based upon
reasonable classification of the objects of
the legislation or the persons whom it
affects. fEqual protection1 does not
prohibit this. Although the wide discretion
as to classification retained by a legislature, often results in narrow distinctions.
These distinctions, if reasonably related to
the object of the legislation, are sufficient
to justify the classification." New York
Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S.
573; 82 L.Ed. 1024 (1937) .
In 1958 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle
of classification stating:

-10-

"If the selection or classification is
neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests
upon some reasonable consideration of
difference or policy, there is no denial of
equal protection of the law. [citations
deleted] That a statute may discriminate in
favor of a certain class does not render it
arbitrary if the distinction is founded upon
a reasonable distinction or difference in
State policy."
The law of reasonable classification has been adopted
into Utah law.
In State v. Taylor,12 the defendant was convicted of
operating a business without a license.

He claimed the

classification denied him equal protection in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The

Supreme Court explained that inequality may exist among
members of different classes.

All that is required, under

the Fourteenth Amendment is equality of treatment among
members of each class.
As the Court said:
"The state is not required to resort to close
distinction or to maintain precise,
scientific uniformity with reference to
composition, use, or value. A state must
proceed upon a rational basis, and may not
resort to a classification which is palpably
arbitrary. However, the state may discriminate in favor of a certain class, if the
discrimination is founded upon a reasonable
distinction or difference in State policy."
at p. 1126.
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-528 3
L.Ed.2d 480, 485, 79 S.Ct. 437 (1959).
12

541 P.2d 1124 (1975).
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In this case State law forbids persons under age 21 to
buy or consume alcoholic beverages.

It also forbids persons

under age 21 from owning or receiving any license authorized
under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
Salt Lake City is promoting the purpose of the State
law by making it unlawful for any person to be in a Class
"C" tavern.

These taverns are licensed to sell draft or

packaged beer for consumption on the premises.

As shown in

Point III infra, they are different in character, business
make up, and atmosphere from any other alcohoLic beverage
licensee.

As such they consist of a separate legitimate

classification.
POINT III
THE PROHIBITIONS ON MINORS IN CLASS "C"
LICENSED TAVERNS IS A VALID PROHIBITION BASED
UPON A VALID CLASSIFICATION.
Salt Lake City has a variety of classes of licenses for
alcoholic beverages.

See Appendix A.

Within each of these

classifications are separate and distinct privileges and
duties.

We note the State of Utah has also adopted various

classes of licenses with its attendant privileges and duties
in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
The State Alcoholic Beverage Control Act Section 32A-11 et seq. sets up as different classes State liquor stores,
package agencies, restaurant liquor licenses, private clubs,
special use permits and special event permits.
different restrictions and privileges.
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Each has

Each has a different

number of maximum licenses allowed.

Each has a different

manner in which local governing bodies are involved in the
decision process.

Each has different operational

restrictions applicable to its type of license.
Each is clearly a separate class of license with a
different sales operation and clientele.

For example,

restaurant liquor licensees cannot close more than 72 hours
without giving prior notice to the Liquor Commission and
they must derive at least 70% of its total restaurant
business from food.
Private club liquor licenses must obtain written
consent of the local authorities while restaurants do not.
Private clubs must have a place where meals are served in
connection with indoor dining accommodations (32A-5-5
U.C.A.).

Private clubs must have membership records, fees

and monthly dues.

No officer or managing agent, employee or

other person is to derive "a principal economic benefit from
the operation of the club."

(32A-5-7(22) U.C.A.).

The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act also recognized that
retail licenses for "light beer" are unique and thus local
governments have power to regulate these items.

It appears

the differences are so unique that the Court can take
judicial notice of the differences.
list of some differences includes:

A short and incomplete
(1) no tavern or Class

"C" license is required to serve food; (2) no percentage of
the sales must be food; (3) no restriction is made as to

-13-

profits and to whom they are to be paid; (4) the principal
business of a Class M C" tavern is to sell draft or packaged
beer for consumption on the premises.
In all license classifications the prohibitions on
minors being sold or served alcohol are imposed, but it is
clearly more of a problem to regulate that prohibition in
Class "C" tavern whose main purpose is to make money selling
as much beer as possible to people on the premises than it
is private clubs or restaurants.

The restriction

prohibiting minors in a tavern (Class M C" license) is a
valid regulation.

It promotes the legitimate State concern

which prohibits the sale to or consumption of alcohol to
persons under age 21.
In a case directly in point, the Utah Supreme Court
ruled the manager of a Class "C" licensed bar lounge could
be held strictly liable for allowing a 19 year old
participant in a fashion show to be on the premises in
violation of Section 19-3-9 R.O.S.L.C.,

Salt Lake City v.

Ronnenburg, 674 P.2d 128 (1983).
The Court briefly addressed the question of equal
protection and due process as it addressed the
reasonableness of the absolute liability provision.
In Ronnenberg the Court held:
"We do not find the ordinance prohibiting the
presence of minors on the premises that sell
beer to be arbitrary. The prohibited
activity has a direct relation to the
public's interest in regulating alcohol and

-14-

protecting minors. The ordinance is designed
to protect this public interest in similar
fashion to the authorization given cities to
prohibit the sale of beer in theatres, at
dances or close to schools. (citations
deleted) Furthermore, the sweep of the
ordinance is not too broad. It applies only
to persons operating or employed in an
establishment for the sale of beer. Such
affected persons have the opportunity to
avoid the consequences of the law."
(Emphasis added) at p. 129.
The Utah Supreme Court has thus authoritatively ruled
the requirement of Section 19-3-9 R.O.S.L.C. is a reasonable
regulation which does not impact unequally on people.
Clearly Section 19-3-8 which is the corollary to Section 193-8 is also a reasonable regulation which provides equal
protection.
The fact appellant-Anderson Jode Anderson is the wife
of James Anderson is no import as we note State law
specifically prohibits ownership of an alcohol licensed
business in any classification by a minor (as defined in the
Liquor Control Act a minor is a person under age 21.
5(21)).

32A-1-

The prohibition of persons under age 21 from a

Class "CM licensed tavern promotes the state interest of not
allowing persons under age 21 to drink alcoholic beverages.
It removes them from a business whose main purpose - if not
sole purpose - is to sell beer.
POINT IV
THE ORDINANCES HAVE A PLAIN MEANING AND THIS
COURT NEED NOT CONSTRUE CITY ORDINANCE AS
PLAINTIFF REQUESTS.

-15-

The appellant-Andersons' throwaway argument in Point
III of their Brief that this Court should judicially rewrite
the Salt Lake City ordinances to comply with the appellantAndersons1 self-serving interests is an insult to the
American system of government.

This obvious bad faith

argument is more deserving of Rule 11 sanctions than a
serious response.
The "construction" which the appellant-Andersons would
have the Court place on the ordinances would be clearly
contrary to the unambiguous legislative intent and the plain
meaning of the ordinance.

As the Utah Supreme Court held in

In re Stevens1 Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 P.2d 85 (1942):
"The language of the statute is plain and its
meaning is clear, in which case there is no
occasion to search for its meaning beyond the
statute itself." (Extensive citations
omitted.)
See also Sutherland Statutory Construction, Section 45.02
(4th Ed.); 75 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, Section 194.

The appellants1 mis-citation of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915) is evidence of the bad faith nature
of this entire appeal. Truax is totally irrelevant to this
case and deals solely with illegal employment discrimination
against aliens. Truax, supra at 43, does note, however,
that:
[T]he legislature may recognize degrees of
evil and adapt its legislation accordingly.
. . . (citations omitted).
As shown in Point I-III above the City ordinances make a
rationally supportable distinction.

-16-

In this case the appellant-Andersons presented no proof
of the ordinance's invalidity at the trial nor in their
brief before this Court,
CONCLUSION
The ordinances in question, 19-3-8 and 19-3-9
R,O.S.L.C. are constitutional.

Class "C" licensed taverns

constitute a valid classification of licenses*

The

privileges and restrictions placed upon holdings of Class
"C" licenses promote a valid state purpose.

Those

challenged ordinances are entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality under both State and federal law.

As

these ordinances deal with alcoholic beverages the City need
only show a rational basis for the restriction.

Appellant-

Andersons have the burden of proving the acts
unconstitutional and have failed to produce any evidence
which shows denial of equal protection.

This Court should

uphold the ordinances as being constitutional under both the
State and United States Constitutions.
DATED this

day of October, 1987.

GREG R. HAWKINS
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
GRHrcc
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BEER LICENSES

19-1-10-19-1-11

Sec. 19-1-10. Wholesaler. "Wholesaler" means any person other than a
brewer or retailer engaged in importation for sale or in the sale of beer in
wholesale or jobbing quantities.
Sec. 19-1-11. Restaurant. "Restaurant" as used in connection with the
issuance of Class ltBM retail license shall mean premises where a variety of
hot food is prepared and served for consumption on the premises.
Bill No 95 June 10 1976
Bill No 151 1977

Chapter 2
BEER LICENSES
Sections:
19-2-1.
19-2-2.
19-2-3.
19-2-4.
19-2-5.
19-2-6.
19-2-7.
19-2-8.
19-2-9.
19-2-10.
19-2-11.
19-2-12.
19-2-13.
19-2-14.
19-2-15.
19-2-16.
19-2-17.
19-2-18.
19-2-19.
19-2 20.
19-2-21.
19-2-22.

License to sell beer at wholesale.
License to sell beer at retail.
Retail licenses classified.
Class "A" license.
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Operation to be in conformance with law.
Name change.
Increased costs.

Sec. 19-2-1. License to sell beer at wholesale. It shall be unlawful for any
person to engage in the business of selling beer at wholesale within the
limits of Salt Lake City without first obtaining a license therefor from the liquor control commission of Utah and paying a fee therefor in the sum of two
hundred dollars per annum.
Sec. 19-2-2. License to sell beer at retail. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of the sale of beer at retail, in bottles, cans or
draft, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City without first having procured a license therefor from the Board of Commissioners of said city as
hereinafter provided. A separate license shall be required for each place of
sale and the license itself shall identify the specific premises covered
thereby and said license shall at all times be conspicuously displayed in the
place to which it shall refer or for which it shall be issued. All licensees shall
comply with the provisions of the liquor control act of Utah and the regulations of the liquor control commission and this chapter, and every license
shall recite that it is granted subject to revocation as is provided in section
19-2-21 of this chaDter.
.
32-4-17, U.CA. 1953.
Sec. 19-2-3. Retail licenses classified. Retail licenses issued under the
provisons of this chapter shall be classified into the following types which
shall carry the privileges and responsibilities hereinafter set forth in this
chapter:
Class " A "
Class " B "

Class " C "
Class " D "

Class " E "
Seasonal Club

No. 157i
3 Jan. 80

Sec. 19-2-4. Class " A " license. A class " A " retail license shall entitle the
licensee to sell beer on the premises described in said license in original containers for consumption off the premises in accordance with the Liquor Control Act of Utah and these revised~city ordinances; provided, however, that
it shall be unlawful for the licensee to sell or distribute beer in any container
larger than a half gallon.
NO. 34,1974
Sec. 19-2-5. Class " B " license, (a) A class l 4 B" retail license shall entitle
the licensee to sell beer in the original containers on the premises.
(b) Only bona fide restaurants, where a variety of hot food is
prepared and cooked and complete meals are served to the general public in
May, 1974
Dec, 1975
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connection with mdoor dining accommodations, and which food sales
constitute at least 600/o of the gross dollar values of licensee's business shall
be entitled to class UB" licenses.
(c) The holders of class "B" licenses shall maintain records which shall
disclose the gross sale of beer and the gross sales of food served for
consumption on the licensed premises during each and every month of the
year. In those licensed premises which are also licensed to allow
consumption of liquor on the premises m accordance with chapter 4 of this
title, the sales of carbonated and noncarbonated soft drinks, soda water,
water, and other mixers shall not constitute the sales of food within the
meaning of this ordinance and such licensee shall maintain a separate record
which shall disclose the gross sales of such drinks during eacn and every
month of the year. The foregomg sales shall be shown separately in said
records and each licensee shall retain all mvoices, vouchers, sales slips,
receipts, and other records of purchases of beer, soft drmks, and food from
his suppliers. Such records and supporting data shall be available for
inspection and audit by the city license assessor and collector or the city
auditor at any time following the end of each month and for eighteen months
thereafter.
Failure of a licensee to properly maintain or submit said records for
inspection and audit shall be cause for suspension or revocation of his
class "B" license.
(d) If any audit or inspection discloses that the sales of food served for
consumption on any licensed premises hereunder are less than sixty percent
of the gross dollar volume of business for any month, the class "B" license of
such licensee may be suspended by the board of city commissioners, after
the licensee has been afforded notice and a hearing regarding said license,
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person under the age of twenty-one
years to sell or serve beer or liquor under this license.
(f) It shall be unlawful for any licensee, operator, manager or any
other person in charge of a restaurant holding a class "B" retail license to:
(1) Sell food for consumption on the premises in an amount which
constitutes less than 60% of the restaurant's gross dollar volume of business
during any monthly period; or
(2) Sell beer or liquor if said establishment is licensed for such, other
than m conjunction with the purchase of food menu items; or
(3) Advertise the sale of beer or liquor other than within the menu or
by word of mouth; or
(4) Hire or allow or permit any person under twenty-one years of age
to serve beer or liquor for consumption on the premises.
Bill No 151 1977

October 1976
ADHI
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If any audit or inspection discloses that the sales of food served for
consumption on any licensed premises hereunder are less than sixty percent
of the gross dollar volume of business for any month, the class UB" license of
such licensee shall immediately be suspended and shall not be reinstated until
the licensee is able to prove to the satisfaction of the board of commissioners
that in the future the sales of food served for consumption on the licensed
premises will exceed sixty percent of the gross dollar volume of business.
No person under the age of twenty-one years shall sell or serve beer
under this license.
It shall be unlawful for any licensee, operator, or manager, or any other
person in charge of a business holding a class UB" retail license to hire or allow
or permit any person under twenty-one years of age to serve beer for
consumption on the premises.
Feb 1970
Bill No. 97, Aug. 28^ 1975

Sec. 19-2-6. Class " C " license. A class " C " retail license shall entitle
the licensee to sell beer on draft for consumption on or off the premises
and to all the privileges granted the holders of class "A" and " B " retail
licenses in accordance with the liquor control act of Utah.
Sec. 19-2-7. Class "D" license. A class " D " retail license shall entitle
the licensee to sell packaged beer for consumption on the licensed premises
and shall entitle the holder thereof to all the privileges granted the holders
of class "A" and " B " retail licenses in accordance with the liquor control
act of Utah. A class " D " license shall be required for all premises where
the primary or main business is that of selling packaged beer for consumption on the licensed premises. Class " D " licenses shall be issued and
renewed only to the present licensed establishments and shall be eliminated
upon the termination of business of the present class " D " establishments.
Sec. 19-2-8. Class "E" license. No beer may be sold or dispensed to
the public on or within any publicly-owned recreation facility by any person,
corporation or organization except by the holder of a class " E " retail
license for such premises. A class "E'" retail license shall entitle the licensee to sell beer for consumption on publicly-owned recreation facilities;
provided, however, that no such class " E " license shall be issued unless
such prospective licensee shall first obtain a concession contract from the
public body owning the recreation facility involved. Under this class " E "
license, no beer may be sold in the original containers, but must first be
emptied into suitable temporary containers; and no person under the age
of twenty-one years of age may sell or serve beer. All sales and deliveries
under this license shall be made directly to the consumer.B,u NO-61*Jun0 29 « 1971
Sec. 19-2-9. Seasonal license. A seasonal license shall carry the privileges
of a class "C" retail license and shall be for a period of less than one y^ai
to be determined by the board of commissioners.
Jan. 1975
Dec. 1975
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